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‘Reductive Individualism and the Just War Framework’
Helen Frowe
Stockholm University
1. Introduction
Over the past decade or so, work in just war theory has largely divided into two theoretical
camps. The first camp, which I will call exceptionalism, adheres to the historically dominant
view that there are at least some respects in which war is morally distinctive. On this account,
there can be justifications for harming in war that would not obtain outside of war.
Often, this exceptionalism is coupled with a form of collectivism. This collectivism
holds that groups can be the object of moral evaluation and prescription in their own right,
such that the fact that an action is undertaken on behalf of a certain sort of group – typically,
but not necessarily, a state – can make a difference to that action’s moral status.1
The second theoretical camp, reductive individualism, rejects both of these claims.
Reductive individualism comprises two strands. The reductivist strand holds that the moral
principles that justify harming in war are wholly reducible to the moral principles that govern
harming in ordinary life – for example, the principles of self-defence and other-defence.
There are no moral principles or justifications unique to war – no exceptions of the sort
described above. Of course, there are often factual differences between war and ordinary life.
War is usually very complicated, making it harder to ascertain certain facts that might be
relevant to the morality of harming. War also involves harming on a great scale through
coordinated activities involving institutions of various sorts, which is not typically true of
harming in ordinary life. But, according to the reductivist, the underlying moral principles do
not change as we move from peace to war (nor as we move through the sometimes rather
indeterminate phase between the two).

1

See, for example, Lazar, Kutz and Zohar
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The individualist strand of this view claims that the proper objects of moral evaluation
and prescription are individuals. On this view, the fact that an action is undertaken on behalf
of a certain sort of group does not affect its moral status. And, individualists believe that all
morally relevant values are reducible to their value for individuals.
Together, these claims constitute a radically revisionist view of the ethics of war
(which, for brevity’s sake, I’ll refer to as reductivism), according to which war is to be
evaluated in terms of the moral rights and duties of individuals. I favour the reductivist
approach, but my aim here is not to offer a general defence of this view.2 Rather, I want to
explore some broad theoretical implications of the reductivist view that seem to me to have
been largely overlooked by reductivists themselves.

2. The traditional just war framework
The central claim of this paper is that we should wholly reject the distinction between jus ad
bellum and jus in bello. These categories form part of a familiar framework for discussing the
ethics of war. But for the ad bellum / in bello distinction to be useful, these categories must
differ from each other in at least one of the following ways: they either evaluate different
facts (they are different in object), or contain different moral principles (they are different in
content). The standard view, of course, is that the two categories are distinct in both these
respects. Jus ad bellum is usually said to govern the resort to war, or the war ‘as a whole’. A
standard account of jus ad bellum holds that in order to be ad bellum just, a war must have a
just cause, be a last resort for securing that just cause, be proportionate to that just cause, and
have a reasonable prospect of success by legitimate means.3 Some accounts (including some
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But see Frowe (2014); McMahan (2009); Fabre (2013). For criticism of reductivism, see Lazar (this volume),
Shue, Rodin
3
Some writers argue that there is no success condition attached to individual self-defence (see, e.g. Uniacke
2014). But, as I have argued elsewhere, this is a mistake. The success condition applies in cases of self-defence
that risk harm to innocent bystanders. However, I think that when it comes to liable attackers, defence can be
permissible even if there is only a slim prospect of success. Since individual self-defence is usually aimed at
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reductivist accounts) also include conditions of legitimate authority and right intention, but
these are controversial so I’ll set them aside here.4 Jus in bello, in contrast, is usually said to
govern specific offensives within war – that is, to judge the actions of combatants. The
standard account of the content of jus in bello is a requirement to discriminate between
legitimate and illegitimate targets, and to cause only harm that is necessary for securing, and
proportionate to, a military advantage.

3. Content
Let’s begin with the putative difference in content of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
Reductivism is usually characterized (as I characterized it above) as the view that the moral
principles governing harming in war are the same as the moral principles governing harming
in ordinary life. But of course this is simply one application of reductivism’s more general
claim that there is a single set of principles that determines the justness of using force. These
principles are invariant across all contexts – self-defence, policing, measures-short-of-war
(such as drone strikes) and war – and satisfying them is necessary and sufficient for a use of
force’s being justified. But if this is true, and if jus ad bellum and jus in bello are both
intended to judge the use of force, they cannot contain different principles by the reductivist’s
lights.
If reductivism holds that there is a single set of moral principles for judging the use of
force, it follows that a politician’s ordering of force at t must satisfy the same criteria as a
combatant’s use of force at t1. I suggest that the relevant criteria are those standardly
included in accounts of jus ad bellum: one has a just cause, force is proportionate to that

liable attackers and does not endanger bystanders, this is probably why it often seems as if there is no success
condition. In war, however, collateral damage is very often a feature of defensive force, and thus even harms
that are aimed at liable combatants must satisfy the success condition in order to justify the risk to innocent
people.
4
But see Jonathan Parry for a defence of the role of legitimate authority in reductivist accounts
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cause, is necessary (that is, the least harmful means of achieving that cause) and has a
reasonable prospect of success by legitimate means.
Since these principles are usually found in accounts of jus ad bellum, we need to see
why they are also the principles that apply to the specific offensives within war that are
traditionally the remit of jus in bello. The conditions of proportionality and necessity clearly
have counterparts in standard accounts of jus in bello, so I perhaps don’t need to say too
much about those. But I think it is also now fairly widely accepted that having a just cause for
fighting is relevant to the justness of an individual combatant’s actions.5 As Jeff McMahan
and Thomas Hurka have argued, having a just cause is relevant to the justness of a
combatant’s actions because it is a prerequisite of satisfying proportionality. Proportionality
weighs morally relevant harms against morally relevant goods. If one lacks a relevant moral
good to secure – if one’s aim is simply to contribute to the unjust expansion of territory, for
example – there’s nothing to outweigh the harms that one causes.6 A similar argument
applies with respect to necessity. The fact that force is the least harmful means of achieving
an end can form part of a justification for using force only when the end is morally good. The
fact that I need to kill you to steal your wallet does not provide some partial justification for
killing you. When the end is morally wrong, there’s no role for necessity to play.
Given this, there must be a just cause for each individual harmful action if it is to
satisfy necessity and proportionality. Notice that this doesn’t mean that the only admissible
just cause for using force is the just cause that initially gave rise to war. As Saba Bazargan
has pointed out, there could be other just causes for using force, such as defending innocent
non-combatants against unjust attacks.7 A combatant might have a just cause for some of her
actions, and lack a just cause for others. Even those writers who have recently defended the
5

See, for example, Estlund ‘On Following Orders in an Unjust War’, Journal of Political Philosophy; Lazar,
this volume.
6
McMahan, Hurka
7
Bazargan, ‘Aiding and Abetting Unjust Wars’, Journal of Moral Philosophy
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idea that state combatants enjoy special permissions to do violence do not claim that this puts
combatants with an unjust cause on a moral par with combatants with a just cause. Their
concern is rather to show that unjust combatants are not on a moral par with unjust attackers
in ordinary life.
What of the requirement of discrimination? Again, this putative in bello condition is
found in the ad bellum condition that war must have a reasonable prospect of success by
legitimate means. Impermissible means of fighting – which includes means that fail to
discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets, or that inflict unnecessary suffering
– do not count for the purposes of having a reasonable prospect of success. The fact that one
could, for example, use biological weapons to secure one’s just cause would not count as
satisfying the success condition because it would be impermissible to use such weapons even
if using them were necessary. But once we spell out the success condition in this way, we can
see that the requirement to discriminate is found in both the ad bellum and in bello categories.
Whilst the success condition is usually included only as a condition of jus ad bellum,
specific offensives within war must also have a reasonable prospect of success. I have argued
elsewhere that this condition is motivated by concerns about collateral harm.8 It is wrong to
use force against even a liable attacker if doing so has little prospect of achieving a just cause
and risks serious harm to innocent people. Given this, combatants must consider how likely
their individual actions are to achieve their goal, and whether the prospect of success of each
action warrants any predicted collateral harm.
That there is a single set of conditions for the just use of force is the deeper and more
general truth underlying various reductivist arguments. For example, Michael Walzer and
Jeff McMahan’s famous debate about the moral equality of combatants is framed as a
disagreement about the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Walzer believes
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that the two are morally independent, such that a combatant can satisfy the in bello conditions
even if her war is ad bellum unjust. McMahan, in contrast, argues that satisfying jus ad
bellum is a necessary condition of satisfying jus in bello. But if, as I suggest, the reductivist
account of war cannot sustain a difference between these two categories, this way of framing
the debate is confused. McMahan is clearly right that combatants cannot satisfy jus in bello
whilst violating jus ad bellum. But this is because they are the same conditions, not because
there is some kind of moral dependence between jus in bello and jus ad bellum.

4. Object
Some just war theorists agree that jus ad bellum and jus in bello consist in the same
principles, but argue that the categories are nonetheless useful because there is some
difference between their evaluative objects. Cécile Fabre, for example, suggests that the
terms are merely “a convenient way to demarcate various phases in the initiation, conduct
and termination of a war”.9
But it seems to me that this is a mistake. Making ad bellum judgements is typically
thought to involve judging the war ‘as a whole’ in some way. But if we claim to be judging
the war as whole – by which we usually mean one ‘side’ of a conflict – we need to know
precisely what constitutes ‘the war as a whole’: what it is that we are evaluating. I’m going to
set aside here historical analyses of past wars, and focus on ad bellum judgments with respect
to prospective wars and wars that are currently being fought.

I suggest that the most

plausible interpretation of this idea is that we are making a prediction about how the war will
be fought – that is, about the individual actions that will make up the war or, in the case of
ongoing wars, remainder of the war. If so, the distinction between the objects of jus ad
9

Fabre, ‘War Exit’, p. xxx. Somewhat oddly, though, Fabre says that the categories lack “deep conceptual or
normative significance” (my italics). A category’s conceptual significance presumably consists in what it picks
out – what I’m calling the evaluative object. If there’s no conceptual distinction between jus ad bellum and jus
in bello, it’s hard to see why Fabre nonetheless regards them as useful labels.
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bellum and jus in bello seemingly collapses. Both judge individual actions. (And, of course,
this seems to be the right kind of result for a reductive individualist, given the claim that
individuals are the proper object of moral evaluation and prescription.)
Defenders of the distinction will likely respond that jus ad bellum offers a kind of
summative verdict of all the combatants’ individual actions: it judges the ‘war as a whole’ by
somehow combining all those individual actions into a single assessment that tells us whether
fighting the war as a whole is just or unjust. In contrast, jus in bello judges only an individual
combatant’s actions, or a very small subset of individual actions tied to a particular offensive.
But what does it mean to combine individual actions in this way? Given that any
plausible assessment of a war will include a prediction that it will contain some wrongdoing,
we need to think carefully about the normative conclusions that we draw from the claim that
a war is overall justified. It wouldn’t follow, for example, that the combatants on this overall
justified side fight justly, since some of them will fight unjustly, violating the principles that
govern the use of force. Nor could we conclude that combatants fighting for an overall
unjustified side will fight unjustly, since they could have just causes for specific actions. It
seems to me that the best guidance we can get from such a judgment is that some of the
individual actions of the war may be performed despite recognising that, if the war is fought,
some wrongdoing will take place.
Of course, this is still a judgement about individual actions: we’re comparing the
number of predicted just actions to the number of predicted unjust actions. But it might seem
that this is nonetheless enough to support the ad bellum / in bello distinction, because making
this judgement involves considering all the individual actions of the war within a given
period, telling us whether the war may (continue to) be fought. But this will support the
distinction only if this is not also what determines whether an individual combatant is
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justified in using force. And it seems to me that, in fact, this is precisely what determines
whether an individual combatant is justified in using force.
At this point, it might be helpful to distinguish between fact-relative justifications for
acting and evidence-relative justifications for acting.10 An agent is fact-relative justified in
acting if the moral facts give her sufficient reason to act. In contrast, an agent is evidencerelative justified in acting if, were her evidence concerning the facts accurate, she would have
sufficient reason to act. We can illustrate this distinction with Trolley and Loop.

Trolley:

A runaway trolley is heading towards a hundred people, and
will kill them unless it is diverted down a sidetrack. Bystander
can divert the trolley down the sidetrack, where it will kill a
single person.

Loop:

A runaway trolley is heading towards a hundred people.
Workman sees that he can divert the trolley down a sidetrack,
where it will kill a single person. However, unbeknown to
Workman, the track then loops round, such that after killing the
single person the trolley will still hit and kill the hundred.

In Trolley, Bystander is fact-relative justified in diverting the trolley. Given that she can save
a hundred lives and will kill only one person as a side-effect, the facts give her sufficient
reason to divert. In Loop, Workman is fact-relative unjustified in diverting the trolley. If he
diverts the trolley, he will needlessly kill one person, and the hundred will still die. However,
Workman is evidence-relative justified in diverting the trolley in Loop, since his evidence is

10

See e.g. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984)
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that diverting will save a hundred lives at the cost of killing one as a side-effect. If his
evidence accurately reflected the facts, he would be fact-relative justified in diverting.
Much of the reductivist literature adopts the fact-relative perspective when assessing
the justness of an agent’s actions. McMahan, in particular, holds that an agent is justified in
causing harm only if she is fact-relative justified.11 Those who act on the basis of evidence
that does not reflect the facts may be excused for so acting, but they are not on a moral par
with those who are fact-relative justified. But on the fact-relative perspective, the range of
facts relevant to a combatant’s actions is not limited to those facts of which she is aware. On
the contrary, the fact-relative justification of her action will depend on all the facts that could
be morally relevant to her action – facts that, if she knew them, she ought to factor into her
deliberations about what to do. So, on this view, even if a combatant does not know what
other members of her country’s armed forces are doing, the fact that she might either be
facilitating their wrongdoing, or that her own actions might depend upon or incentivize their
wrongdoing, will partly determine whether she is justified in using force. From the factrelative perspective, then, there is no difference in the objects of jus ad bellum compared to
jus in bello.
We might reply: all the worse for the fact-relative perspective. This move is open to
reductive individualists as well as their critics. There’s nothing about reductive individualism
that commits its proponents to a fact-relative account of justification. But it’s not clear that
the evidence-relative perspective does any better at sustaining a distinction between the
objects of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Say that we adopt an evidence-based account of
when an action is justified. This might mean that in some cases, a combatant is justified in
acting even though her action is unjust from a fact-relative perspective. But this would
support the ad bellum / in bello distinction only if there were some forms of evidence that
11

KIW, ‘The Conditions of Liability to Preventive Attack’, Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Preventive
War, (Cambridge: CUP, 2013) p. 135
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might be relevant to an ad bellum judgement, but irrelevant to a combatant’s in bello
assessment. But I doubt that this is correct. Of course, as a purely contingent matter, those
people making decision about ‘the war as a whole’ – higher-ranking combatants or politicians
– will likely have more evidence available to them (or, more specifically, evidence about
more people’s actions available to them) than the average combatant. But that doesn’t mean
that they have in principle different objects of assessment in a way supports a distinction
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. There is no evidence that might be relevant to a
commander’s deliberation about whether to use force that should be discarded or ignored by a
lower-ranking combatant. Thus, neither a fact-relative nor an evidence-relative account of
justification vindicates the claim that jus ad bellum and jus in bello have different objects of
assessment.

5. Wars, and overall assessment of wars
If I am right that reductive individualism cannot sustain the ad bellum / in bello distinction,
some people will think that this is a reason to reject the reductive individualist view. Lazar
has argued that the individualist view seemingly precludes identifying the ‘sides’ of a war,
since there’s no obvious way in which individualists can unify the actions of one set of
combatants or citizens into a coherent whole.12 If this is right, he says, reductivism cannot
play the important role of enabling us making to make judgements about the war, and yet, he
argues, such evaluation is both widespread and necessary. Moreover, if we adopt the sort of
individualism that I am proposing, Lazar argues that it no longer makes any sense to ask
whether a war was justified. Rather, we can ask only about the justification of individual
actions that make up the war, and then offer the thought that a war is justified only if each of

12

See Lazar, this volume

	
   10
	
  

those individual actions is justified. He argues that this sets the bar for justification too high,
making “justified wars practically impossible”.
Lazar is right that we are used to talk of just and unjust wars: we do indeed engage in
evaluations of the sort that he describes. But such talk is very often met with skepticism,
commonly expressed by the retort that there is ‘no such thing as a just war’. Even if we adopt
the more measured description of ‘justified’ war, which better captures the sense that many of
the harms of war befall people who are not liable to be harmed, offering a single evaluation
of such myriad actions strikes many people as inappropriate.

And such reactions are

unsurprising. Wars that we typically describe as just – such as the Allies’ war against Nazi
Germany – contain many instances of wrongdoing, ranging from mildly disproportionate or
overly risky offensives to appalling atrocities. No wonder, then, that people baulk at
sweeping evaluations that purport to give us an overall assessment of a war. Moreover, the
natural response to this skepticism is to disaggregate the actions of the war: to grant that of
course, some of the offensives were wrong, and some atrocities were committed, and that
these actions were unjust, but that others were justified in light of the importance of securing
the just cause. If we are looking to reflect how people actually judge war, there’s no reason to
think that a collectivist evaluation of a war as a whole better serves this purpose than a more
nuanced individualist account.

6. Justification and wrongdoing
Despite his emphasis on the importance of distinguishing “the war as a whole” from its
“constituent actions and operations”, Lazar doesn’t elaborate on what it means to evaluate the
war as whole distinct from those constituent actions and operations. The proposed distinction
seems to be grounded in thoughts about what people can control: political and military
leaders can control whether the war is fought, whereas individual combatants can control
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only their own actions and the actions of some of their subordinates. But the sphere of what I
can control does not exhaust the sphere of what is morally relevant to my actions. On the
contrary: war is a particularly complex example of how the justness of what we do can
depend on the actions of others. I think that understanding this interaction helps resolve
Lazar’s worry that individualism sets the bar for justified war too high. My claim is not that
war is justified only if every individual action of the war is justified. My claim is that one can
sometimes be justified in acting even if one foresees that others will then engage in
wrongdoing as a consequence. Consider Prediction:

Prediction:

A runaway trolley is heading to where it will kill one hundred people.
Bystander can divert the trolley down a sidetrack to where it will break
Workman’s legs. But Bystander knows that if she diverts the trolley,
Workman will then divert it again down a second side-track, killing an
innocent person, Jogger, in order to spare himself the cost of broken
legs.

I think that Bystander is justified in diverting the trolley despite knowing that if she does so,
Workman will then engage in the wrongful killing of an innocent person. Two points arise
from this case. The first is that one may be justified in acting even foreseeing that others will
then engage in wrongdoing.13 The second is that there seems to be little point in asking
whether Bystander and Workman’s actions taken together were justified or unjustified:
whether the actions of the case were justified ‘as a whole’. We can ask whether Bystander’s
was justified in acting despite knowing what Workman would do. And we can ask whether
13

Of course, one is not always so justified: if Bystander foresees that if she diverts the trolley, Workman will redivert it towards a hundred people, it would be impermissible for her to divert. See David Rodin, ‘The Myth of
National Self-Defence’, in Fabre and Lazar, The Morality of Defensive War, (Oxford: OUP, 2014) p. 83 and
Frowe, Defensive Killing, pp. 129 - 138
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Workman was justified in acting despite knowing that that he would kill an innocent person.
But there’s nothing useful about trying to come up with some overall assessment of their two
actions considered as a whole. My suggestion is that there’s similarly nothing useful about
trying to come up with some overall assessment of the actions of a war.
Of course, Bystander and Workman are not acting together, whereas combatants in
war are part of a joint project, in the sense that (for the most part) they are trying to achieve
the same goal, and are collaborating to that end. So, consider Cure:

Cure:

Alice is dying of a terrible illness. Bryan and Carl know they need a
hundred leaves from a rare plant to cure her. They agree to find fifty
leaves each. Bryan plans to obtain fifty leaves by stealing some plants
from people who use them only to treat minor ailments. Christian,
Alice’s husband, intends to obtain the other fifty leaves by killing the
owners of some other plants. Once dug up, the plants lose their powers
in a short period of time. If they are not used to cure Alice, they will be
useless.

Bryan and Christian have a joint project of saving Alice. Assume that Bryan’s stealing the
plants from people who would use them only to treat minor ailments is justified if this is
necessary for saving Alice’s life, but that Christian’s killing people to obtain their plants is
unjustified even if it is necessary for saving Alice’s life.
We can imagine several variations of this case. For example, suppose that Christian
will engage in his unjustified actions only if Bryan also acts. If Bryan refuses to steal the
other fifty leaves, Christian will conclude that there’s no point in killing the other owners to
obtain their plants, since the fifty leaves that he will thereby gather will be insufficient to save
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Alice. In this version of the case, Bryan clearly ought not to act, since he will thereby prevent
the unjustified killings. Since partial completion of the plan won’t achieve sufficient good to
warrant the infringements – Alice needs all one hundred leaves to survive, and the plants
can’t be used for any other good end – stealing the plants is unjustified. This would be true
even if there were other, justified ways in which Christian could get the plants, but Bryan
predicts that he won’t use these legitimate means.
One way to understand this argument is as a claim that Bryan lacks a reasonable
prospect of securing his just cause by legitimate means. Even though it seems as if Bryan can
carry out his mission – his part of the joint project – without violating anyone’s rights, the
success of his mission is determined not by whether he steals the plants, but by whether he
saves Alice’s life. And there is no prospect that Alice’s life will be saved by legitimate means
if her being saved depends upon Christian’s engaging in unjustified killings. The success of
Bryan’s plan thus depends upon illegitimate means.
But things seem different when the wrongful actions are not under Bryan’s control, or
have already occurred. It’s not that the actions are then irrelevant to Bryan’s reasoning: on the
contrary, Bryan’s actions might be justified only because Christian will inevitably act, or has
already acted, albeit wrongly. Imagine that Bryan has no way of communicating to Christian
that he will not steal his share of the plants. If Bryan knows that Christian is going to engage
in the wrongful killings, it seems as if Bryan ought to act precisely because he knows that
Christian will act. This isn’t an argument that Bryan can partially redeem the harms that
Christian inflicts by making sure that at least some good results from those killings. It’s rather
that it seems that Bryan ought to regard those harms a kind of sunk cost. Since the owners
will be killed no matter what Bryan does, he has an opportunity to save Alice’s life that does
not involve inflicting any additional unjustified harms.
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But again, it strikes me as confused and unhelpful to ask whether Bryan and
Christian’s actions taken together are justified or unjustified, and that question doesn’t get
more sensible if we start increasing the number of actors involved. When Bryan can prevent
Christian’s wrongdoing by refraining from acting, his acting would be unjustified, and
Christian’s acting would also be unjustified. When Bryan has no control over the fact that
Christian acts, we can describe Christian’s action as unjustified, and Bryan’s action as
justified. It seems to me that this is how a reductive individualist should think about war: not
by trying to combine actions together to offer a single evaluation of war as a whole, but in
terms of the justification of individual actions. If so, there’s no role for the ad bellum / in
bello distinction to play in our accounts of the ethics of war.

7. Conclusion
Reductive individualists have challenged various specific aspects of traditional accounts of
the ethics of war. But insufficient attention has been paid to the broad conceptual
commitments of this view. In this paper, I have argued that reductivism, being a claim that
there is a single set of principles that governs the use of force, commits its proponents to
denying any difference in content between the categories of jus ad bellum and the principles
of jus in bello. Furthermore, individualism, understood as the claim that individuals are the
objects of moral evaluation and prescription, commits its proponents to the claim that there is
no difference in object between the ad bellum and in bello categories. I have argued that it is
false that jus ad bellum can be sensibly understood as evaluating ‘the war as a whole’. There
is no meaningful evaluation to be made about whether the set of individual actions that
compose the side of a conflict are ‘overall’ justified. Rather, we can only meaningfully
evaluate individual actions. However, the justness of these actions will often depend, in
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intricate ways, on the actions of others. Developing a robust reductive individualist account
of the ethics of war will thus require investigating this interdependence in considerable depth.
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